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Preface 
 
 Since I first became enthralled with physics as a teenager, I’ve been intrigued by the 
philosophical aspects of the discipline.  I’m certainly not alone in being fascinated with such 
heady notions as the absence of absolute simultaneity, the twin paradox, curved space-time, 
wave particle duality, the collapse of the wave function, Schrödinger’s cat, and more recently 
dark matter and dark energy.  I was chagrined when I read Richard Feynman’s disparaging 
words about the relation of philosophy and physics1.  On the other hand, the more I read 
Feynman, especially his popular articles, the more I realized that he was, indeed, a very 																																																								†	sboughn@haverford.edu	
1 Near the end of the 7th Messenger Lecture at Cornell in 1964, Feynman opined that fundamental physics will 
inevitably come to an end “because either all is known, or it gets very dull” (i.e., it becomes too difficult to 
make significant progress).  Then “The philosophers who are always on the outside making stupid remarks will 
be able to close in, because we cannot push them away...”		
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philosophical physicist.  Perhaps the footnote on the previous page indicates that he had more 
of a problem with (some) philosophers than with the philosophical conundrums that have so 
beguiled me. 
 As I approached the end of my career as an experimental physicist and observational 
astronomer (I’m now retired), I decided to return to these philosophical matters, some of 
which were still perturbing me, to see if I could finally make enough sense of them to quiet 
my discomfort.  I’ve more or less succeeded in this quest in large part, I believe, because of 
my experimentalist background and a concomitant proclivity for pragmatic explanation.  I’ve 
written several papers that include many of the ruminations in the present paper and these are 
listed below in the References.2   I suspect that many readers of this paper will consider my 
practical approach to be rather pedestrian3 but I am, after all, a pragmatic experimentalist.  In 
any case, I here offer my thoughts on the philosophical foundations of physics. 
 In preparation, I’ve spent many (mostly) enjoyable hours reading, and in some cases 
re-reading, papers and books relevant to the philosophical foundations of physics.  I was 
somewhat taken aback by the fact that several different aspects of my “original” thoughts on 
the philosophy of physics indeed appear scattered throughout many of these works.  In 
addition, I suspect that the many of the remainder of my thoughts can be found in papers, 
which have likewise been influenced by previous works.  I know this from my recent 
readings of books by Mach (1893), Carnap (1966), Jammer (1974), and even William James 
(1908).  At first I thought how clever I was to arrive at some of the same conclusions as these 
notable philosophers.  But, alas, it seems far more likely that I had simply stumbled upon 
some of their thoughts that were imbedded in other works.  From the title of this paper, it is 
clear that I supposed my experimentalist’s view of the philosophy of physics might provide a 
refreshingly different perspective.  Considering that Mach, who was arguably the first 
modern philosopher of physics, was an experimentalist, even this notion is suspect.  One 
paper that has been foremost in my mind ever since I first read it in graduate school is “The 
Copenhagen Interpretation” by the theorist Henry Stapp (1972).  This paper, to which I will 
																																																								2	I	am	not	in	the	habit	of	citing	so	many	of	my	own	papers;	however,	I	do	so	here	because	they	are	sources	of	a	great	deal	of	the	present	paper.		3	Indeed,	the	title	of	one	of	the	papers	listed	in	the	References	is	“A	Pedestrian	Approach	to	the	Measurement	Problem	in	Quantum	Mechanics”.	
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liberally refer, certainly has had a profound effect on my view of quantum mechanics in 
particular and of physics in general. 
While I will make reference to the abovementioned works as well as to others, I make 
no attempt to include a comprehensive history of the philosophy of physics or even to 
carefully assess the works of others in relation to the views presented here.  I’m pleased that 
such an approach was given tacit approval by James (1908) who proclaimed  
 The abuse of technicality is seen in the infrequency with which, in  
philosophical literature, metaphysical questions are discussed directly  
and on their own merits.  Almost always they are handled as if through  
a heavy woolen curtain, the veil of previous philosophers’ opinions.   
Alternatives are wrapped in proper names, as if it were indecent for a  
truth to go naked….You must tie your opinions to Aristotle’s or  
Spinoza’s; you must define it by its distance from Kant’s; you must  
refute your rival’s view by identifying it with Protagoras’s.  Thus does  
all spontaneity of thought, all freshness of conception, get destroyed. 
 It may seem absurd that a relatively short paper could possibly present a meaningful 
account of the philosophical foundations of physics.  Carnap’s 300 page book with a similar 
title treated only a restricted number of fundamental problems.  Jammer’s text, The 
philosophy of quantum mechanics, is 500 pages as is Mach’s The science of mechanics: a 
critical and historical expositions of its principles.  How can I possibly expect to say 
anything meaningful in the less than 50 pages of the present essay?  I can hear my friend and 
graduate school classmate, physicist and philosopher Peter Pesic, whispering over my 
shoulder, “This is an interesting piece.  Why don’t you delve more deeply into the matter and 
then write a book about it.”4   Well, I neither want to write a book nor do I want to delve 
more deeply into the subject.  My purpose here is to sketch a worldview with which one 
might be able to approach fundamental philosophical and interpretational problems.  In fact, 
it might be an advantage to avoid the depth and precision that would limit flexibility in 
dealing with the philosophical conundrums I seek to resolve.  In his correspondence with 
Stapp (1972), Heisenberg pointed to an analogous vagueness in the Copenhagen 
interpretation: “Besides that it may be a point in the Copenhagen interpretation that its 
language has a certain degree of vagueness, and I doubt whether it can become clearer by 																																																								4	He	actually	did	make	such	a	suggestion	regarding	a	previous	paper	(“A	Quantum	Story”),	one	of	those	listed	in	the	References.	
	 4	
trying to avoid this vagueness.”  From what follows you’ll see why I view this attitude as a 
strength and not as a weakness. 
In the next section, I’ll begin with my resolution to one of the conundrums of the 
measurement problem in quantum mechanics, the quantum/classical divide. I say “my” 
resolution but in large part it is informed by Stapp’s paper as well as by the writings of Niels 
Bohr, Eugene Wigner, Wendell Furry, Freeman Dyson (2015), and I’m sure of many others. 
The pragmatic resolution of this problem will provide a useful example that will help situate 
my experimentalist’s approach to the philosophical foundation of physics, on which I’ll 
elaborate in the following section (Section 2).  Section 3 will address several other well 
known philosophical puzzles in physics in the context of my pragmatic experimentalist’s 
approach. 
 
1. THE MEASURMENT PROBLEM AND THE QUANTUM-CLASSICAL DIVIDE 
One of the most important aspects of the measurement problem in quantum 
mechanics has to do with the description of the measuring apparatus.  It is generally accepted 
that the Schrödinger wave function describes the dynamic evolution of a quantum system.  It 
is to be interpreted statistically, that is, the wave function indicates the probability of the 
occurrence of the result of a specific measurement.  On the other hand, one expects quantum 
mechanics to be a universal theory so that the experimental apparatus should also be subject 
to quantum mechanical laws.  If so, then one is left with a probabilistic description of the 
measuring apparatus.  This presents a problem.  The interpretation of the original wave 
function requires that a specific outcome eventually be achieved but if the experimental 
apparatus is described by another probabilistic wave function, no such outcome can be 
identified. So it seems we need a 2nd measuring apparatus to exam the original apparatus but 
the laws of quantum mechanics also govern this second apparatus so it too must be described 
by a probability function.  Then a 3rd apparatus is required and so on ad infinitum. 
Heisenberg expressed this in the extreme, “One may treat the whole world as one [quantum] 
mechanical system, but then only a mathematical problem remains while access to 
observation is closed off.” (Quoted in Schlosshauer and Camilleri 2011)  One of the early 
resolutions to this dilemma, and one that is still entertained today, is the postulate of state 
reduction or collapse of the wave function.  It’s generally accepted that this notion requires 
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new physics that has yet to be discovered.  In Section 3.3, I’ll discuss why wave function 
collapse is neither required nor particularly well motivated. 
The standard textbook resolution of the measurement problem is that offered by Niels 
Bohr and Werner Heisenberg and is generally referred to as the Copenhagen interpretation.  
According to the Copenhagen interpretation, or so the standard argument goes, the act of 
measurement or observation must be described in terms of classical physics.  Because 
classical physics is not (generally) couched in probabilistic terms, the classical measurement 
of a quantum system yields the specific result required by the probabilistic interpretation of 
the wave function.  While possibly resolving the predicament, this explanation immediately 
raises three related questions: 1) Why is it necessary to revert to classical physics in order to 
understand quantum mechanics? 2) When and where does the classical measurement occur, 
i.e., where is the quantum-classical divide? and 3) How does one describe the physical 
interaction across this divide? These are questions that have vexed physicists and 
philosophers since the beginning of quantum mechanics.   
Hugh Everett, the originator of the many worlds interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, expressed a strong objection to the notion of including classical physics in the 
interpretation of quantum mechanics.  In his 1956 PhD thesis (DeWitt & Graham 1973), he 
argued: 
Another objectionable feature of this position [Bohr’s Copenhagen  
interpretation] is its strong reliance upon the classical level from the  
outset, which precludes any possibility of explaining this level on the  
basis of an underlying quantum theory. (The deduction of classical  
phenomena from quantum theory is impossible simply because no  
meaningful statements can be made without pre-existing classical  
apparatus to serve as a reference frame.) This interpretation suffers from  
the dualism of adhering to a “reality” concept (i.e., the possibility of  
objective description) on the classical level but renouncing the same in  
the quantum domain. 
So why didn’t Bohr seem to worry about the unseemly merger of classical and 
quantum formalisms? I suspect the answer is because he didn’t actually consider that any 
such merger is required. While Bohr endeavored to be extremely careful in expressing his 
ideas, his prose is often obscure. However, consider his following brief description of a 
measurement (Bohr 1963, p. 3): 
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The decisive point is to recognize that the description of the experimental 
arrangement and the recordings of observations must be given in plain 
language, suitably refined by the usual terminology. This is a simple 
logical demand, since by the word ‘experiment’ we can only mean a 
procedure regarding which we are able to communicate to others what 
we have done and what we have learnt. 
Nowhere in this description does he refer to classical physics. Stapp (1972) chose to 
emphasize this pragmatic view by using the word “specifications”: 
Specifications are what architects and builders, and mechanics and 
machinists, use to communicate to one another conditions on the concrete 
social realities or actualities that bind their lives together. It is hard to think 
of a theoretical concept that could have a more objective meaning. 
Specifications are described in technical jargon that is an extension of 
everyday language. This language may incorporate concepts from classical 
physics. But this fact in no way implies that these concepts are valid 
beyond the realm in which they are used by technicians. 
The claim is that descriptions of experiments are invariably given in terms of operational 
prescriptions or specifications that can be communicated to the technicians, engineers, 
and the physics community at large.  Such operational prescriptions are not part and parcel of 
classical mechanics.  They are not couched in terms of point particles, rigid solid bodies, 
Newton's laws or Hamilton-Jacobi theory but rather are part of Bohr's “procedure regarding 
which we are able to communicate to others what we have done and what we have learnt.” 
Camilleri and Schlosshauer (2015) point out, “Bohr's doctrine of classical concepts is not 
primarily an interpretation of quantum mechanics (although it certainly bears on it), but 
rather is an attempt by Bohr to elaborate an epistemology of experiment.” So it seems to me 
that Everett’s (and others’) assertion that Bohr insisted on merging a quantum system with a 
classical measuring apparatus is a “straw man” that has little to do with Bohr’s interpretation 
of quantum mechanics. In fact, one can find several passages in Bohr’s writings where he 
claims that the physics of experimental apparatus is certainly describable by the formalism of 
quantum mechanics (Bohr 2010, Camilleri & Schlosshauer 2015). But that description has 
little to do with the “epistemology of experiment”. 
In some sense, classical physics has precisely the same problem in that experiments 
are not described by the formalism of the theory but by the same operational specifications to 
which Stapp refers (Boughn and Reginatto 2019). This point has certainly not gone unnoticed 
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by those trying to come to grips with the quantum/classical divide. At a 1962 conference on 
the foundations of quantum mechanics, Wendell Furry explained (Furry 1962) 
So that in quantum theory we have something not really worse than 
we had in classical theory. In both theories you don't say what you do 
when you make a measurement, what the process is. But in quantum 
theory we have our attention focused on this situation. And we do 
become uncomfortable about it, because we have to talk about the effects 
of the measurement on the systems....I am asking for something that the 
formalism doesn't contain, finally when you describe a measurement. Now, 
classical theory doesn't contain any description of measurement. It doesn't 
contain anywhere near as much theory of measurement as we have here 
[in quantum mechanics]. There is a gap in the quantum mechanical theory 
of measurement. In classical theory there is practically no theory of 
measurement at all, as far as I know. 
At that same conference Eugene Wigner put it like this. (Wigner 1962) 
Now, how does the experimentalist know that this apparatus will measure 
for him the position? “Oh”, you say, “he observed that apparatus. He looked 
at it.” Well that means that he carried out a measurement on it. How did he 
know that the apparatus with which he carried out that measurement will tell 
him the properties of the apparatus? Fundamentally, this is again a chain 
which has no beginning [end]. And at the end we have to say, “We learned  
that as children how to judge what is around us.” And there is no way to do  
this scientifically. The fact that in quantum mechanics we try to analyze the 
measurement process only brought this home to us that much sharply. 
Physicists have long since become comfortable with the relation between theory and 
measurement in classical physics, so the quantum case should not be viewed as particularly 
vexing. 
So it seems that experiments and observations are essential in giving meaning to both 
classical and quantum mechanics. As Heisenberg pointed out, without observations the 
theoretical formalism provides us with no more than mathematical problems that are 
disconnected with the outside world.  Quantum and classical formalisms provide no 
instructions on how a measurement is to be performed. Physical theories are compact 
mathematical models together with a set of rules for interpreting the formalism in terms of 
observations and experiments but are silent on how to perform the latter. On the other hand, 
experimental physics is an immense archive of descriptions of instruments and procedures 
partly based on classical and quantum theory, to be sure, but also on previous experiments, 
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phenomenology, conventional wisdom, past experience, physical intuition, and with a large 
emphasis on the importance of calibration, which obviates the need for the complete 
understanding of an experimental apparatus.  In addition, the entries in these tomes have to 
be translated into Stapp's specifications so that experimental physicists, engineers, and 
technicians can create the apparatus necessary to make and then interpret a measurement. 
These specifications are given in Bohr's “plain language”, which is not the formal language 
of classical mechanics. The relations and theoretical constructs of the formalism of classical 
mechanics are not part of the language used to communicate the specifications needed by 
engineers and technicians to build and carry out experiments.   
It seems likely that the measurement problem in quantum mechanics has been 
exacerbated by the lack of experimental expertise possessed by many of those scholars who 
hold forth on the dilemma of quantum measurement and this situation has contributed to the 
intractability of the problem.  This is not to say that the fuzzy connection between theory and 
experiment has not been grasped by many physicists. In his paper, “Physics and Reality” 
Einstein (1936) mused, 
The connection of the elementary concepts of every day thinking with  
complexes of sense experiences can only be comprehended intuitively and  
it is unadaptable to scientifically logical fixation. The totality of these  
connections, - none of which is expressible in notional terms, - is the only  
thing which differentiates the great building which is science from a logical  
but empty scheme of concepts. By means of these connections, the purely  
notional theorems of science become statements about complexes of sense 
experiences... Physics constitutes a logical system of thought...The justification  
(truth content) of the system rests in the proof of usefulness of the resulting  
theorems on the basis of sense experiences5, where the relations of the latter  
to the former can only be comprehended intuitively. 
 It should be obvious why the resolution of the measurement problem offered by the 
Copenhagen interpretation appeals to my experimentalist’s pragmatic view of the world.  
Even though it was conjured by two theoreticians, Bohr and Heisenberg, it’s also obvious 
why theoretical physicists might be less sanguine about it.  In any case, I hope that the above 
treatment will serve to set the stage for my experimentalist’s view of the philosophical 
foundations of physics, to which I now turn. 																																																								5	There	is	a	certain	irony	in	this	statement.		It	seems	to	be	entirely	consistent	with	a	pragmatic	philosophy	and	by	extension	with	Bohr’s	view	as	we	shall	see	in	the	next	section.	
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2.  PRAGMATISM AND THE PHILSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS 
While I found most of my readings in the philosophical foundations of physics to be 
interesting, very few resonated with me.  Most were quite detailed and theoretical in a way 
that didn’t capture my view of the totality of physics, theory AND experiment.  For example 
von Neumann’s treatment of a quantum mechanical experiment, although still considered 
relevant today, is nearly unrecognizable to me as the description of an experiment.  In his 
1932 book, Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik (von Neumann 1955), von 
Neumann provides a quantum mechanical treatment of an experimental apparatus by 
ascribing to it a wave function  characterized by a pointer value  that is associated 
with the eigenvalue An of some quantum operator A . The wave function of the combined 
system (quantum system plus experimental apparatus) is given by  where 
 are the eigenfunctions of A associated with the quantum system to be measured. It is 
assumed that the pointer value can be accurately determined from an examination of the 
apparatus by any observer (although, such an examination presumably takes place outside the 
confines of the quantum mechanics).  While one might argue that the identification of the 
wave function  of an experimental apparatus is possible in principle, the practicality of 
such an identification is clearly absurd.6  In addition, the notion that  could possibly 
capture all the nuances of the description of an experiment, including Stapp’s operational 
specifications, is ludicrous. 
 I think my pragmatist’s view of the foundations of physics began to crystallize while 
pondering the redoubtable 1935 paper by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR)7.  I first read 
the EPR paper when I was in graduate school and was mystified. I had assumed the paper 
would present an argument concerning the self-consistency of quantum mechanics or lack 
there of.  Instead, it seemed to be less about physics and more about the philosophical issue 
of what constitutes reality. The conclusion of EPR was quite simply that quantum mechanics 
“does not provide a complete [true] description of the physical reality”. It was only recently 																																																								6	For	example,	assigning	a	wave	function	to	the	7000	tonne	ATLAS	detector	at	the	Large	Hadron	Collider	(	http://img804.imageshack.us/img804/8259/sl2407020161.jpg	),	with	which	the	Higgs	boson	was	recently	discovered,	is	inconceivable	to	me.  7	The	EPR	paradox,	Bell’s	theorem,	and	spooky	action	at	a	distance	are	the	subject	of	Section	3.5.	
	 10	
that I began to worry about, not the veracity of EPR’s claim, but about the very meaning of 
“a complete and true description of physical reality”.  Just what do these words mean?  I 
think I know what one means by “a complete and true description of a house”.  It means that 
one is provided with a complete set of photographs, architectural drawings, list of 
construction materials, etc.  However, these items and the person reviewing them are 
certainly external to what we mean by “the house”.  On the other hand, I’m not so sure I 
know what one means by a complete and true description of the physical reality.  In this case, 
both the description and the beings who generate and review the description are surely part of 
physical reality.  If so, a complete description must include the description itself and the 
people generating and reviewing it.  I have no idea how this might be accomplished.  It 
would seem to require that the recipient of such “a complete description of the physical 
reality” be an entity external to physical reality, which would place the whole discussion in 
the realm of religion or mythology and well outside that of physics.8  In a recent essay 
(Boughn 2019a) I observed that whenever the concept of reality is raised in the context of 
interpretations of quantum mechanics it is a warning to me that I’m about to be led down a 
rabbit hole and, therefore, suggested that in physics discourse the term “reality” should be 
avoided at all costs. Even so, any conversation about the philosophical foundations of 
physics must eventually deal explicitly with the notions of reality and truth.  
During the last millennium, philosophers have discussed the real world in an 
extraordinary number of ways: logical positivism, logical empiricism, radical empiricism, 
pragmatism, pluralism, realism, rationalism, materialism, monism, idealism, dualism, 
pantheism, just to name a few.  I sometimes think that such labels have been created and 
applied to the work of individual philosophers in an effort to pigeonhole them for the purpose 
of criticizing their thoughts.9  I’ve often found that I agree with some of the ideas presented 
in the context of many of these philosophical theories while objecting to other ideas in these 
same theories.  Luckily, I’m following Williams James’s advice (given in the preface) and, 
therefore, will resist categorizing my philosophy in this way.  Nor will I attempt to place it in 																																																								8	I	appreciate	the	irony	that	my	objection	to	EPR’s	conclusion	is	analogous	to	those	who	object	to	the	Copenhagen	interpretation’s	contention	that	the	experimental	apparatus	and	observer	cannot	be	included	in	the	formal	quantum	mechanical	description	of	the	complete	system.	9	I	suppose	that	such	labels	also	find	use	in	generating	exams	for	university	students.		I’m	also	dubious	about	this	practice.	
	 11	
the context of the theories of others.  
 So how do I characterize the real world?  I take it as a matter of faith that the real 
world exists.  Why?  It’s quite simple.  Every morning when I wake up, I experience the real 
world.  I’ll rarely use the term “reality” in the remainder of this paper and when I do it will 
be in the same context; reality is what I experience. The question then becomes, how do 
people make sense of these experiences.  The answer is again quite simple.  They make up 
stories about their experiences.  The purposes of these stories are several: to facilitate 
communicating experiences to others; to draw comparisons to other experiences; to predict 
future experiences (e.g., sunrises and sunsets); to motivate actions that (presumably) bring 
about changes to the “real world”, changes that lead to predictable future experiences; in 
short to make sense of experiences and, by extension, to make sense of the real world.  Do 
these stories provide “true” descriptions of the real world?  Of course not; they are stories, 
human inventions created to help us deal with our experiences (see the Einstein quote in 
Section 1).  On the other hand, our stories certainly do provide insight into the natural world 
and thereby help us to understand it.  But in the end, the only direct connection our stories 
have is to our experiences.  The relation of such stories to physics is simple.  Our formal, and 
usually mathematical, physical theories are, in the end, just stories that we use to make sense 
of our experiences in the ways just described.  
 Of course, some (many) of these stories will be simply wrong.  What we value are 
“true” stories.  So what makes a story or a physical theory true.  The sense I get from the 
EPR paper is that a true theory must provide a complete description of reality, which they 
characterize as having an accurate one-to-one correspondence between individual theoretical 
states and all aspects of reality.  This probably goes beyond what most physicists mean by 
truth.  Many of us would probably be content with a provisional truth characterized by the 
confirmation of predictions of the theory; although, this may not go far enough.  I suspect 
that the realists among us might hold onto the Einsteinian ideal that a true statement is one 
that accurately describes some aspect of the real world, whether or not that truth is ultimately 
demonstrable.  As you might expect, since I don’t subscribe to a reality that can ever be 
accurately described, I find this notion of truth to be equally vacuous.   
At this point, I unashamedly fall back on James’s pragmatic definition of truth as the 
identification of the degree of utility of the theory.  A theory or story is true to the extent that 
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it is useful in making sense of our experiences.  In the absence of direct knowledge of the 
physical world, this is the best we can do.  In the case of physics, the experimental or 
observational confirmation of the predictions of a theory is, perhaps, the most common 
expression of the usefulness of a theory and therefore of the truth of a theory.  However, the 
degree to which a physical theory suggests connections to other theories or to extensions of 
the current theory is also a measure of the usefulness (truth) of the theory.  Certainly the ease 
with which predictions can be generated from a theory and, I suppose, even the elegance of a 
theory can be considered measures of its utility. 
 The previous two paragraphs constitute a bare-bones account of my pragmatic view 
of the philosophical foundations of physics.  “Bare-bones” indeed!  One might rightfully 
complain that I’ve given so little detail as to render my worldview of little use to either 
philosophy or physics.  Even my allusion to James’s account of truth is abbreviated in the 
extreme.  He felt it necessary to write many dozens of pages on the topic.  To be sure, James 
delves deeply into the subject, which by necessity involves such considerations as 
experiences, feelings, consciousness, cognition, cognitive relations, senses, knowing, mental 
content, common percepts, ideas, and of course reality, among others.  I am certainly not 
criticizing his analysis but would point out that his efforts had much more to do with 
psychology and neuroscience than with physics.  I’m sure there are many reasons why one 
might pursue such an elaborate model, for example, a desire for a complete description in the 
sense as expressed in the EPR paper, an attempt to include a direct path to the resolution of 
any philosophical problem that might be raised, or even an effort to differentiate one’s 
philosophy from all others.  Whatever the reason, such detailed worldviews often leave little 
room for my perspective of “the fuzzy connection between theory and experiment” nor even 
of Einstein’s contention that “complexes of sense experiences can only be comprehended 
intuitively”.  As I wrote in the preface, I feel that “it might be an advantage to avoid the 
depth and precision that would limit flexibility in dealing with philosophical conundrums.”  
This should be already apparent in the resolution of the quantum/classical divide that was 
presented in Section 1 and I hope that the cases dealt with in the following section will 
provide further examples of the utility of my bare-bones pragmatic worldview.  On the other 
hand, the vagueness of this philosophy leaves open the possibility of entertaining novel ways 
of treating specific physical and philosophical problems. 
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 There are two corollaries to my pragmatic philosophy of physics.  Many years ago, I 
came upon the Einstein quote, “It is the theory which decides what we can observe.”  As you 
can imagine, this declaration was an irritation to my experimentalist temperament.  John Bell 
repeated Einstein’s thought in a 1990 paper entitled, “Against Measurement”.10  As far as I 
can tell, Einstein’s utterance came during a 1926 conversation with Werner Heisenberg.  It 
was Heisenberg’s first meeting with Einstein and he relates the details of it in Physics and 
Beyond (Heisenberg 1971).  Einstein was expressing his disagreement with Heisenberg’s 
quantum mechanics and its refusal to even consider the orbits of electrons within an atom.  In 
his defense, Heisenberg made the comparison to Einstein’s rejection of the concept of 
absolute time and simultaneity in special relativity.11  Their extended conversation somewhat 
soothed my irritation.  Given Einstein’s argument in the subsequent EPR paper, I will take 
the liberty to re-express his sentiment.  According to Einstein, every observation must be 
describable by an unambiguous statement in the physical theory.  Okay, but let me turn this 
statement around with the claim that every meaningful statement in a physical theory must be 
directly (or perhaps indirectly) related to some observation.  This is the first corollary to my 
pragmatic philosophy and I will use it to judge whether or not statements in the context of a 
physical theory are meaningful.  The very first example in the next section deals with the 
notion of simultaneity in special relativity.12 
 The second, related corollary has to do with the status of theoretical constructs, such 
as the Schrödinger wave function.  There is a tendency to elevate the constructs of highly 
successful theories to the status of “real” entities and subsequently to posit questions about 
them as if they resided in the natural world.  Of course, the structure of a theory often 
provides insight into how to extend that theory or even on how to replace it with its 
successor.  But that’s a far cry from endowing a theoretical construct with reality in the sense 
that Einstein apparently required of a quantum state (if quantum mechanics were to provide 
“a complete description of the physical reality”).  In an effort to resist the tendency to 
attribute physical reality to theoretical constructs of successful models, perhaps we should 																																																								10	Bell’s	paper	similarly	irritated	me.	11	Einstein	retort	to	Heisenberg	:	“Possibly	I	did	use	this	kind	of	reasoning,	but	it	is	nonsense	all	the	same.”	(Heisenberg	1971)		When	Philipp	Frank	made	a	similar	plea,	Einstein’s	response	was	“A	good	joke	should	not	be	repeated	too	often.”	(Isaacson	2007) 12	Heisenberg	also	used	this	example	in	his	1927	paper	on	the	indeterminacy	relation	(see	Section	3.2).	
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apply to such constructs an aphorism analogous to that offered by Stapp for the description of 
a measurement (see Section 1), something like, the constructs of a theoretical model may 
incorporate concepts of classical (and everyday) language; however, this fact in no way 
implies that these concepts are valid beyond the realm in which they are used by physicists. 
In other words, theorists must declare the meaning of such constructs and not try to discover 
their meanings as if they were part of the natural world.  This is the second corollary to my 
pragmatic philosophy. 
 The legitimate application of this second corollary is not always immediately 
apparent.  For example, one might consider negative energy solutions as outside the realm of 
the intended use of the Dirac equation.  Nevertheless, these solutions led to the 1931 
prediction of positrons, which were detected two years later.  I prefer to think that Dirac 
happened upon a model of the electron that was also valid for the anti-electron (positron) 
should it exist.13 On the other hand, pragmatist that I am, this inherent fuzziness of my 
second corollary is not particularly bothersome to me.  
 Before leaving this section, I’ll offer my views on what is probably the more 
conventional philosophy of physics that most practicing physicists have at least somewhere 
in the backs of their minds.14  It seems to me that most physicists ascribe to the notion that 
there is a real physical world and that world is governed by a set of (presumably 
mathematical) physical laws.  The job of physicists is then to discover these laws in the same 
sense that explorers discover new lands.  This view is certainly consistent with that of 
Einstein’s, whether or not one accepts that a single such law provides a complete description 
of the real world (a theory of everything).  This view is to be contrasted with my pragmatic 
view that the job of physicists is to investigate phenomena, i.e., accumulate new experiences, 
and then create mathematical models (stories) that provide true (useful) descriptions of those 
experiences.  The former view portrays the physicist as an ingenious investigator while the 
latter as a creative genius.  As far as I’m concerned these two characterizations are equally 
praiseworthy.  On the other hand, one might well argue that adopting either of these 
philosophies is of no practical consequence.  While contemplating foundational questions 																																																								13	The	negative	energy	solutions	of	the	Dirac	equation	don’t	violate	my	first	corollary	because	Dirac	was	able	to	point	to	their	observable	consequences.	14	I	hasten	to	add	that	many	physicists	undoubtedly	forego	such	metaphysical	deliberations	and	are	content	to	get	on	with	the	business	of	doing	physics.	
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might be compelling (to some), “doing physics” doesn’t seem to require that such questions 
be addressed.  This attitude can be summed up by David Mermin’s assessment of the 
Copenhagen interpretation: “If I were forced to sum up in one sentence what the Copenhagen 
interpretation says to me, it would be `Shut up and calculate!’” (Mermin 1989)  I’m certainly 
sympathetic with this view; however, when it comes to dealing with some of the paradoxes 
and conundrums of physics, one’s philosophical viewpoint is crucial as I hope the following 
accounts in Section 3 will reveal. 
 It is an interesting historical question as to why most scientists, physicists in 
particular, ascribe to the former “ingenious investigator” perspective rather than to that of the 
“creative genius”.  I’m certainly no historian of physics but let me just toss out a possibility 
that has intrigued me for the last 40 years.15  The history of science in the Renaissance was 
marked by the rediscovery of ancient texts.  Among these were the Hermetica, the writings of 
the mythical figure Hermes Trismegistus, who was supposedly a contemporary of Moses.  
“An account of how Hermes Trismegistus received the name "Thrice Great" is derived from 
the Emerald Tablet of Hermes Trismegistus,16 wherein it is stated that he knew the three parts 
of the wisdom of the whole universe” (Hermeticism, Wikipedia).  This picture of scholars 
mining ancient documents to find the wisdom therein strikes me as metaphor for the modern 
view of physics as a quest to find physical laws writ large in Nature.  For Newton, it was 
perhaps more than a metaphor.  He was convinced that Pythagoras knew the inverse square 
law of gravitation and that Moses had raised the possibility that some of the bodies God 
created were much larger than the earth and, perhaps, were habitable (Iliffe 2017).  Much 
more recently, P. A. M. Dirac emphasized the importance of searching for fundamental 
physical truths in the very mathematics eventually used in formal models of these truths.17  
As he expressed it (Dirac 1963) 
  It may well be that the next advance in physics will come along 
  these lines: people first discovering the equations and then 
  needing a few years of development in order to find the physical 
  idea behind these equations.  My own belief is that this is a more 																																																								15	I	have	a	distinct	memory	of	a	1976	dinner	conversation	with	an	old	friend,	Paul	Boynton	(University	of	Washington),	who	introduced	me	to	this	notion.		At	least	this	is	they	way	I	remember	it.				16	A	translation	of	the	Emerald	Tablet	can	be	found	in	Isaac	Newton’s	papers.	17	Max	Tegmark	has	expressed	this	in	the	extreme	by	proposing	that	the	real	world	is	precisely	its	mathematical	structure	(Tegmark	2008).	
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  likely line of progress than trying to guess at physical pictures. 
While Dirac’s view may be a bit extreme, it strikes me that many (most?) theorists seem to 
proceed as if they are searching for the mathematical formalism that represents the laws of 
physics as if those mathematical laws have been preordained by Nature herself.  This is 
certainly at odds with my pragmatist’s view that physicists themselves create theories solely 
for the purpose of making sense of our experiences. 
 
3.  CONUNDRUMS IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS 
 The following are examples18 of how philosophic pragmatism (or at least my version 
of it) can be used to resolve well-known foundational dilemmas in physics.  The first 
example, the lack of absolute simultaneity in special relativity, was resolved long ago but 
serves as a useful illustration of the pragmatic argument.  Also, there continue to be 
misleading proclamations about special relativity, especially regarding the twin paradox. 
 
3.1  SIMULTANEITY, TIME DILATION, AND THE TWIN PARADOX 
One of the main lessons I learned from special relativity was to pay strict attention to 
the degree to which theoretical quantities can be measured, which clearly aligns with my 
experimentalist background. Einstein based his 1905 analysis on the empirical relation that 
the speed of light was a constant, independent of the motion of an inertial observer.  He then 
rendered this ostensibly absurd notion to be self-consistent by prescribing time to be simply 
that quantity which is measured by an observer with an ideal clock and not some physical (or 
metaphysical) entity that flows through and determines the evolution of the universe.  In 
short, Einstein’s position was entirely consistent with the 1st corollary offered above.  He 
then proceeded, with the aid of a light clock, to demonstrate that the notion of the 
simultaneity of two events is not absolute but rather relative to particular observers and their 
clocks. This was the essence of Heisenberg’s 1926 response to Einstein’s complaint about 
quantum mechanics (see Section 2).  
																																																								18	The	quantum/classical	divide	of	Section	1	should	be	considered	as	another	example	of	how	one	of	the	aspects	of	the	quantum	measurement	problem	can	be	successfully	resolved	in	the	context	of	a	pragmatic	philosophy.	
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 Once one accepts the consequences of the relative nature of simultaneity, most of the 
other perplexing aspects of special relativity become transparent.  The twin paradox is a 
prime example.  Nevertheless, while this “paradox” was resolved long ago, I’m amazed at 
how many of my students (and occasionally colleagues) still seem to be mystified by it.  One 
of the standard resolutions of the twin paradox is the realization that the experiences of the 
two twins are not the same; the one who has experienced acceleration ages less and the other 
twin who has not experienced acceleration has aged more.  Unfortunately, this leads the 
novice student of relativity to conclude that the differential aging is a direct result of the 
acceleration of the younger twin and even more perplexing it has led some physicists to 
claim that the twin paradox can only be resolved within the general theory of relativity.19  To 
help dispel these notions I conjured a twin paradox scenario wherein the two twins have 
identical experiences, acceleration and all, and yet one twin ends up younger than the other 
(Boughn 1989).  Even so, many students of physics are not satisfied.  Not content with the 
special relativistic prediction of the behavior of clocks, they want to know “why” the 
acceleration causes one of the twins to age less and “when” the extra aging of the stay-at-
home twin occurs.  These seem like meaningful questions; however, neither of them can be 
identified with an observation and, therefore, they are rendered meaningless by the 1st 
corollary of my pragmatic philosophy.20  My claim is that all of the apparent paradoxes of 
special relativity involve theoretical statements that have no connections to observations and, 
therefore, can be similarly dismissed.  I leave it as an exercise for the reader to verify this 
claim. 
Most of us consider special relativity to be a complete, self-consistent formalism that 
is capable of predicting the outcomes of all observations of electromagnetic phenomena that 
don’t involve other physics such as the quantum properties of atoms.  This might lead one to 
suspect that Einstein’s ideal clocks are fictions whereas a pragmatic experimentalist must 
deal with real, physical clocks.  This question must be addressed before one can fully analyze 
scenarios like the twin paradox.  I have argued (Boughn 2013) that the effects of acceleration 
a on real atomic clocks are of the order of al/c2 where l is some characteristic length for the 
																																																								19	To	the	contrary,	special	relativity	is	quite	capable	of	dealing	with	accelerated	clocks	and	observers.	20	To	be	sure,	it	is	possible	to	specify	measurements	that	seem	to	answer	the	question	of	when	the	extra	aging	occurs;	however,	such	measurements	are	altogether	arbitrary	and	certainly	not	unique.	
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clock and c is the speed of light.21  The characteristic length for an atomic clock is 
undoubtedly larger than the size of an atom but is surely no larger than the physical size of 
the clock apparatus, i.e., .  For an acceleration equal to that of gravity on the 
surface of the earth and  l , we have al/c2  10-16, comparable to the accuracy of the 
best atomic clocks.  So for current time determination and reasonable accelerations, our best 
clocks are good approximations to Einstein’s ideal clocks.  Nevertheless, this exercise serves 
to emphasize the importance of experiment to the foundations of even special relativity. 
 
3.2  HEISENBERG’S INDETERMINACY RELATIONS 
 The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is not normally considered a “quantum 
conundrum” yet it is still the topic of a great deal of theoretical analysis.  As we noted 
elsewhere (Boughn & Reginatto 2018): 
Nevertheless, the question of how to relate Heisenberg’s analysis to the 
formalism of quantum mechanics has never been completely settled and 
discussions about the meaning of and primacy of Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
relations have continued unabated. These discussion often focus on one or 
more of the different expressions of the uncertainty principle such as: 
restrictions on the accuracy of simultaneous measurements of canonically 
conjugate quantities, e.g., p and q; restrictions on the spread of individual 
measurements of conjugate quantities made on an ensemble of similarly 
prepared systems; restrictions on the physical compatibility of experimental 
arrangements for accurately measuring different observables; and the 
inevitable disturbance of a system due to its interaction with a measuring 
device. 
Therefore, it is entirely appropriate to include the uncertainty principle in a discussion of the 
philosophical foundations of physics.  
 For me, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle was perhaps the most important piece of 
my education in introductory quantum mechanics.  It is empirical in that it involves a 
(hypothetical) gamma ray microscope and, perhaps for that reason, it provided me with 
something tangible to help grasp the mysteries of quantum mechanics.  This feeling was 
bolstered by the common (textbook) interpretation of the meaning of Heisenberg’s principle, 
that one cannot simultaneously measure p and x without incurring errors in the measurements 																																																								21	While	the	analysis	in	that	paper	was	somewhat	detailed,	straightforward	dimensional	analysis	gives	the	same	result.	
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that satisfy an inequality.  Unfortunately, any insight I seemed to acquire from Heisenberg’s 
principle quickly evaporated.  The standard expression of the uncertainty principle, 
, was derived by Kennard four months after Heisenberg’s paper.  Kennard’s 
derivation is straight from the formalism of wave mechanics and makes no reference to 
actual measurements of p and x.  The ’s in the expression refer to the variances of p and x 
operating on a wave function , e.g., , and so the 
uncertainty principle is simply a statement about the statistical dispersions about the 
expectation values of these operators relative to a given wave function whether or not any 
measurements are made.  Furthermore, if measurements are made, there is no requirement 
that they be simultaneous only that they are made relative to the same quantum state .  That 
is, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, as stated above, is simply a statement about 
statistical dispersions of quantum operators with respect to quantum states and has nothing to 
do with observational or experimental uncertainty. You can imagine how this understanding 
served to undermine my hope for developing some experimental intuition about quantum 
mechanics. 
 About 10 years ago I came upon an English translation of Heisenberg’s 1927 paper 
(Wheeler and Zurek 1983) and read it with interest.  If one considers Heisenberg’s 
microscope not as a measuring apparatus but rather as a quantum state preparation device, it 
is straightforward to make a connection between this device and the statistical dispersions of 
quantum operators represented in the standard expression of the uncertainty principle 
(Ballentine 1970).  However, Heisenberg’s purpose was much more general than this and 
more in line with my initial reading of the uncertainty principle.  His pragmatic point of view 
certainly resonated with me.  Very early in his paper, Heisenberg noted: 
  When one wants to be clear about what is to be understood by the 
  words “position of the object”, for example of the electron (relative 
  to a given frame of reference), then one must specify definite  
  experiments with whose help one plans to measure the “position 
  of the electron”; otherwise, this word has no meaning. 
Later in the paper, as noted in footnote 12, he cited an analogous case in relativity: 
  It is natural in this respect to compare quantum theory with special 
  relativity.  According to relativity, the word “simultaneous” cannot 
  be defined except through experiments in which the velocity of 
  light enters in an essential way….We find a similar situation with 
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  the definition of the concepts of “position of an electron” and  
  “velocity” in quantum theory.  All experiments which we can use  
for the definition of these terms necessarily contain the uncertainty  
implied by equation (1) [ ]. 
These statements are an indication of why Heisenberg (at least the young Heisenberg) was 
labeled a logical positivist by some.  They are certainly direct examples of the application of 
the 1st corollary to my pragmatic philosophy presented in Section 2. 
 Heisenberg introduced a -ray microscope with which one can determine the position 
of an electron with arbitrary accuracy so long as the wavelength of the -ray is small enough. 
His argument was that it is only possible to determine the position to an accuracy on the 
order of the wavelength  of the -ray, i.e., .  In the process of making this 
measurement, the -ray imparts a momentum impulse to the electron proportional to the 
momentum of the -ray photon, which by the Einstein relation is .  The unknown 
momentum disturbance to the electron will also be of this order so that the uncertainty in the 
electron’s momentum is  (assuming the initial momentum of the electron is 
known).  From these two relations for  and  one concludes that , Heisenberg’s 
indeterminacy relation.22  This simple relation was the first and most important in his paper.  
To be sure, Heisenberg considered the indeterminacy relation to be a direct physical 
interpretation of the quantum mechanical commutation relation, , but he 
clearly considered it to be an empirical result and not just a relation following from the 
formalism of quantum mechanics. 
 In the abstract to the paper, Heisenberg declared, “This indeterminacy is the real basis 
for the occurrence of statistical relations in quantum mechanics.”  This also resonated with 
my initial hope that the uncertainty principle would help me grasp quantum mechanics.  Near 
the end of his paper he states, 
  We have not assumed that quantum theory— in opposition to  
classical theory— is an essentially statistical theory in the sense  
that only statistical conclusions can be drawn from precise initial  
data. ...what is wrong within the sharp formulation of the law of 																																																								22	Bohr	and	others	criticized	Heisenberg	for	omitting	the	details	of	the	optics	of	the	microscope.		When	these	are	included	the	result,	 ,	is	unchanged.	I	suspect	that	Heisenberg	was	satisfied	with	his	original	argument	as	he	noted:	“…one	does	not	need	to	complain	that	the	basic	equation	[ ]	contains	only	qualitative	predictions.”		A	qualitative	relation	was	all	he	sought.	
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causality, “When we know the present precisely, we can predict  
the future,” is not the conclusion but the assumption.  Even in  
principle we cannot know the present in all detail.  For that reason  
everything observed is a selection from a plenitude of possibilities  
and a limitation on what is possible in the future.  As the statistical  
character of quantum theory is so closely linked to the inexactness  
of all perceptions, one might be led to the presumption that behind  
the perceived statistical world there still hides a “real” world in  
which causality holds.  But such speculations seem to us, to say it  
explicitly, fruitless and senseless. 
The pragmatic tone of this declaration is quite clear.  Heisenberg didn’t stop there.  He 
opined, “Of course we would also like to be able to derive, if possible, the quantitative laws 
of quantum mechanics directly from the physical foundations— that is, essentially, from 
relation (1) ” but then was forced to conclude that “We believe, rather, for the 
time being that the quantitative laws can be derived out of the physical foundations only by 
use of the principle of maximum simplicity.”  There were two recent attempts (Hall & 
Reginatto 2002; Boughn & Reginatto 2018) to fulfill Heisenberg’s wish.  I’ll leave it to the 
reader to decide whether these were successful. (I think they were. J)  In a similar vein, I 
recently penned an essay (Boughn 2018c and 2019c) that addresses the question, “What is it 
about our world that led us to a quantum mechanical model of it?”  
 
3.3  COLLAPSE OF THE WAVE FUNCTION 
 Collapse of the wave function (state reduction) is often considered to be part of the 
standard interpretation of quantum mechanics.  However, Bohr did not consider it so.  Just 
how did this concept enter the quantum lexicon?  Some credit (blame?) Heisenberg from 
comments he made in his seminal paper on the uncertainty principle (Heisenberg 1927).  
There, he notes that as a consequence of observing an atomic system “we will find the atom 
has jumped from the nth [superposition] state to the mth state with a probability…” and, in a 
discussion of an electron wave packet, he comments, “Thus every position determination 
reduces [my italics] the wavepacket…”  Perhaps, the first careful discussion of state 
reduction appeared in von Neumann’s 1932 influential text The Mathematical Foundations 
of Quantum Mechanics (von Neumann 1955) in which he gave a quantum mechanical 
description of measurements.  He specified two processes in quantum mechanics: the 
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discontinuous change of states that occurs as a result of a measurement (state reduction); and 
the unitary evolution of quantum states (e.g., the Schrödinger equation).  Dirac was more 
explicit in his equally revered text, The Principles of Quantum Mechanics, (Dirac 1958) 
When we measure a real dynamical variable , the disturbance  
involved in the act of measurement causes a jump in the state of the  
dynamical system. From physical continuity, if we make a second  
measurement of the same dynamical variable  immediately after the  
first, the result of the second measurement must be the same as that  
of the first. Thus after the first measurement has been made, there is  
no indeterminacy in the result of the second. Hence, after the first 
measurement has been made, the system is in an eigenstate of the  
dynamical variable , the eigenvalue it belongs to being equal to the  
result of the first measurement. This conclusion must still hold if the  
second measurement is not actually made. In this way we see that a 
measurement always causes the system to jump into an eigenstate of  
the dynamical variable that is being measured, the eigenvalue this  
eigenstate belongs to being equal to the result of the measurement. 
This seems like a reasonable conclusion; so what is my problem with it?  For one thing, 
measurements rarely proceed in such a fashion.  After a measurement, the object that the 
wave function describes is usually nowhere to be found.  Even a relatively simple experiment 
as provided by a Stern-Gerlach apparatus usually ends with a polarized atom striking a 
photographic emulsion (or the modern equivalent) after which there is no conceivable way to 
measure its state again.  To be sure, in special cases the quantum system can be measured to 
be in a particular eigenstate and afterwards can be found in that same state.  In those cases it 
seems as if the wave function might actually have collapsed. 
 So how would a pragmatist like Bohr explain the “apparent” collapse of the wave 
function?  Before answering this question, it is necessary to address the question of what we 
mean by the term “wave function”.  By “mean” I’m referring to the empirical meaning that 
an experimentalist like me needs to know.  It is here that Stapp’s 1972 paper on the 
Copenhagen interpretation informs us.  In Stapp’s practical account of quantum theory, a 
system to be measured is first prepared according to a set of specifications, A, which are then 
transcribed into a wave function , where x are the degrees of freedom of the system.  
The specifications A are “couched in a language that is meaningful to an engineer or 
laboratory technician”, i.e., not in the language of quantum (or even classical) formalism.  
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Likewise, B are a set of specifications of the subsequent measurement and its possible results.  
These are transcribed into another wave function , where y are the degrees of freedom 
of the measured system.  How are the mappings of A and B to  and  effected?  
According to Stapp, 
 …no one has yet made a qualitatively accurate theoretical description  
 of a measuring device.  Thus what experimentalists do, in practice,  
is to calibrate their devices…[then] with plausible assumptions…it  
is possible to build up a catalog of correspondences between what 
experimentalists do and see, and the wave functions of the prepared 
and measured systems.  It is this body of accumulated empirical 
knowledge that bridges the gap between the operational specifications 
A and B and their mathematical images  and .  Next a transition  
function  is constructed in accordance with certain theoretical  
rules…the ‘transition amplitude’   
is computed.  The predicted probability that a measurement performed  
in the manner specified by B will yield a result specified by B, if the  
preparation is performed in the manner specified by A, is given by  
. 
Of course, our use of quantum wave functions is not limited to the experimentalist’s 
laboratory.  One often assigns a wave function to systems and measurements that have been 
prepared naturally.  Consider, for example, the case of the emission of 21 cm radiation from 
atomic hydrogen in the interstellar medium.  In that case one specifies the initial upper 
ground state wave function, the subsequent lower ground state wave function, and the 
interaction that results in the emission of radiation. In this case, the interstellar environment 
takes the place of the experimentalist’s laboratory.  Nevertheless, the conditions of this 
environment provide the operational specifications that the astronomer must translate into 
quantum states.  Also, it is unlikely that such translations could ever be made without the 
laboratory experiments that informed us about quantum phenomena. 
 What’s my point here?  It is that the quantum mechanical wave function is a 
theoretical construct that we invented to deal with our observations of physical phenomena.  
As such, it seems reasonable that we derive our understanding of it according to how we use 
the concept.  This is precisely the point of the 2nd corollary of my pragmatic philosophy. 
Stapp’s (and Bohr’s) pragmatic account of wave functions is intimately tied to state 
preparation and measurement, both of which are described in terms of operational 
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specifications that lie wholly outside the formalism of quantum mechanics.  Prior to the 
preparation of a system the wave function is not even defined and after it has been measured 
the wave function ceases to have a referent.  To extrapolate the notion of the wave function 
to its pivotal roll in von Neumann’s and Dirac’s process of state reduction is an enormous 
leap that necessitates dropping all references to the operational specifications that give wave 
functions their meanings in the first place.  One might be led to such an extrapolation by 
ascribing an ontic reality to the notion of wave function (despite its epistemic transitory 
nature).  This is especially tempting when presented with some of the incredible successes of 
quantum theory.  I was certainly enticed to do so when I first learned of the twelve decimal 
place agreement of the quantum electrodynamic prediction with the measured value of the g-
factor of the electron.23 However, one should be wary of deeming a single (or even several) 
high precision measurement(s) as strong evidence in this regard.24 
 We now return to the question of how a pragmatist like Bohr might explain the 
“apparent” collapse of the wave function.  The Copenhagen interpretation’s resolution of the 
problem (according to Stapp 1972) is straightforward.  In the case that the quantum system is 
disrupted upon the completion of a measurement, the pre-measurement wave function simply 
ceases to have meaning and there is nothing that requires the notion of wave function 
collapse.  In the special cases mentioned above, the measurement does not disrupt the 
quantum system but leaves it in a state with a well-defined wave function that can be used to 
predict a subsequent measurement.  This is the only time that the notion of wave function 
collapse might make sense.  However, in this case the pragmatist would simply point out that 
the original specifications of the quantum system must be replaced by new ones that include 
the results of the first measurement.  “Then the original wave function will be naturally 
replaced by a new one, just as it would be in classical statistical theory” (Stapp 1972).  Some 
physicists prefer to claim, euphemistically, that wave function collapse happens in the mind 																																																								23	When	I	was	a	graduate	student	it	was	considered	prescient	that	the	acronym	for	quantum	electrodynamics	(QED)	was	the	same	as	for	the	Latin	phrase	quod	erat	demonstrandum.	24	Otherwise,	one	might	argue	that	spectroscopic	measurements	of	hydrogen	provided	incontrovertible	proof	of	the	Bohr-Sommerfeld	model	of	the	hydrogen	atom.	The	precise	(1	part	in	1014)	timing	measurements	of	the	binary	pulsar	might	be	argued	to	imply	the	correctness	of	general	relativity	(Hawking	and	Penrose	1996)	even	though	the	current	consensus	is	that	classical	general	relativity	is	not	a	fundamental	theory.	Another	example	is	Maxwell’s	equations,	which	predict	a	Coulomb	inverse	square	law	that	has	been	confirmed	to	a	precision	of	one	part	in	1016	even	though	we	know	that	quantum	electrodynamics	is	the	more	fundamental	theory	(Williams,	et	al.	1971;	Fulcher	1986).	
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of the observer but not for any physical reason.  For example Hartle (1968) noted, 
The “reduction of the wave packet” does take place in the consciousness 
of the observer, not because of any unique physical process which takes 
place there, but only because the state is a construct of the observer and 
not an objective property of the physical system. 
Even thought Bohr’s pragmatic interpretation of quantum mechanics long ago dispensed of 
the notion of wave function collapse, to this day extensions of quantum mechanics that 
hypothesize collapse mechanisms are still be proffered by distinguished theorists (e.g., 
Penrose 1996; Adler and Bassi 2009).  As you can imagine, until new experimental 
observations point in that direction, a pragmatist might not be interested in such endeavors. 
 
3.4  SCHR DINGER’S CAT AND DECOHERENCE 
 An issue closely related to wave function collapse is the paradox of Schrödinger's cat 
(Schrödinger 1935). If quantum mechanics is, indeed, the fundamental theory of the physical 
world, then presumably macroscopic systems like a cat are also governed by the theory. In 
Schrödinger's1935 gedanken experiment, a cat is penned up in a chamber with a radioactive 
substance that is monitored by a Geiger counter. The half-life of the substance is such that 
after one hour there is a 50% chance that a single radioactive atom will have decayed in 
which case the counter discharges. If so, then a relay releases a hammer that shatters a flask 
of hydrocyanic acid and the cat dies. If the counter does not discharge, the flask is not broken 
and the cat lives. After one hour, the wave function of the entire system expresses this 
situation by having equal parts of an alive cat/undecayed atom and a dead cat/decayed atom 
and thus the “indeterminacy originally restricted to the atomic domain becomes transformed 
into macroscopic indeterminacy"(Schrödinger 1935).   When the box is opened and the cat 
plus atom system observed, the wave function collapses into one of these two states. This is 
absurd. Surely, the cat is either alive or dead before the box is opened even if we don't know 
which is the case. In addition, if the observer is also viewed as a quantum system by another 
observer, Wigner's friend (Wigner 1967), then the first observer is also in one of two 
quantum states and the result of her observation doesn't become definitive until a second 
observer observes her.  This conundrum can be carried on ad infinitum with the introduction 
of third, fourth, fifth,…. observers. 
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Is it ever meaningful to describe the cat as in a superposition of alive and dead states?   
Decoherence theory is often invoked as a resolution.  As we described it elsewhere (Boughn 
& Reginatto 2013) 
Decoherence theory is neither new physics nor a new interpretation 
  of quantum mechanics; although, it is certainly relevant to questions  
of interpretation. In decoherence theory, the measuring apparatus and  
the environment with which it inevitably interacts are both treated as  
purely quantum mechanical systems. As a consequence of the  
interactions of the quantum system of interest with the measuring  
apparatus and it with its immediate environment, the three become  
entangled, i.e., strongly correlated with each other. All, or at least  
most, of the environmental quantum degrees of freedom are not  
observable (certainly, not observed) and, therefore, must be summed  
over to achieve a reduced state of the system plus apparatus. The net  
effect of the enormous number of environmental degrees of freedom is  
that off-diagonal terms of the reduced density matrix rapidly vanish,  
i.e., coherence between the different eigenstates of the system/apparatus  
is lost. Thus, decoherence theory demonstrates why it is that quantum 
coherence is seldom, if ever, observed at the classical (macroscopic)  
level. 
Quantum decoherence allows for the quantum treatment of the cat yet demonstrates why the 
live cat/undecayed atom and dead cat/decayed atom portions of the combined wave function 
will not exhibit quantum interference. This conclusion is reached without invoking wave 
function collapse but the paradox is still not resolved.  Before being observed the live cat and 
dead cat are still described by a quantum state, albeit a mixed state, which cannot be 
distinguished experimentally from the classical claim that there’s a 50% chance the cat is 
alive and a 50% chance the cat is dead.  This mixed quantum state would still require 
quantum state reduction if the state of the cat is ultimately determined to be alive or dead and 
this is tantamount to admitting that before being observed, the cat is still in a composite state, 
the situation that vexed Schrödinger. 
  While I find these sorts of analyses interesting, I long ago came to doubt that there 
was any need to resolve this quantum/classical dilemma.  For me, Schr dinger’s cat poses no 
paradox.  I certainly assume that in principle the cat can be treated quantum mechanically, in 
which case the quantum state would consist of the superposition of a live and dead cat.  As 
pointed out in Section 1, I’m sure that Bohr and Heisenberg would agree.  Perhaps they 
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would even agree, again in principle, that one could perform an interference experiment to 
reveal the presence of both the live and dead states.  On the other hand, the difficulty of 
performing such an experiment would render bringing the dead back to life trivial by 
comparison.  Finally, even if I were to find the decoherence argument compelling, I would 
characterize it as simply demonstrating the consistency of the quantum mechanical 
microscopic world with the classical macroscopic world rather than demonstrating how 
classical physics might emerge from quantum mechanics.  The pragmatic resolution of the 
paradox is simply to point out that there is no paradox.  The entangled wave function is not to 
be viewed as an ontic representation of the cat but rather as a tool that physicists use to 
prepare systems and predict the results of measurements.  As argued in Section 3.3, wave 
function collapse is not physically meaningful. 
 
3.5  THE EPR PARADOX, BELL’S THEOREM, AND QUANTUM NONLOCALITY25 
 In the 84 years since the 1935 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paper (EPR), 
physicists and philosophers have mused about what Einstein referred to as spooky action 
at a distance (Born 1971). Bell’s 1964 analysis of EPR-type experiments has been cited more 
than 10,000 times and I suspect that most of the citations have occurred in the last decade or 
two. Many of these describe experiments involving entangled quantum states and, as an 
experimentalist, I have great admiration for much of this work. Many more are theoretical 
and philosophical papers trying to come to grips with what is often referred to as quantum 
nonlocality. Bell’s conclusion was that any hidden variable theory designed to reproduce the 
predictions of quantum mechanics must necessarily be nonlocal and allow superluminal 
interactions. In his words (Bell 1964) 
In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics  
to determine the results of individual measurements, without  
changing the statistical predictions, there must be a mechanism  
whereby the setting of one measurement device can influence 
the reading of another instrument, however remote. Moreover,  
the signal involved must propagate instantaneously, so that such  
a theory could not be Lorentz invariant. 																																																								25	I’ve	written	four	papers	bearing	on	these	subjects	(Boughn	2016,	Boughn	2017,	Boughn	2018a,	Boughn	&	Reginatto	2019)	and	the	reader	is	referred	to	these	for	more	detailed	analyses.		The	following	is	a	truncated	synthesis	of	those	papers.	
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I have no problem with this conclusion.  Unfortunately, Bell later expanded his analysis and 
mistakenly concluded that quantum mechanics itself is nonlocal and this led him to 
apprehend the “gross nonlocality of nature” Bell (1975).  Many physicists and philosophers 
of science seem to harbor this same belief.   
 While the EPR paper is often credited with bringing the notion of entangled quantum 
states and action at a distance to the attention of the physics community, the major figures in 
physics at the time were already arguing about entanglement and Einstein had been bothered 
by action at a distance since the 1927 Solvay conference (Howard 2007).  At Solvay, he used 
a single slit gedanken experiment to illustrate the action at a distance required by quantum 
mechanics.  Consider the simpler case of diffraction by a small hole. The Schrödinger wave 
function of a particle emanating from the hole is essentially a spherical wave indicating that 
the particle can be detected at any point on a hemispherical screen with equal probability.  
Therefore, the detection of the particle at any point on the screen must cause the wave 
function to instantaneously vanish everywhere except at that point, hence, action at a 
distance. Einstein pointed out that this was not a problem if the wave function is taken to 
represent the behavior of an ensemble of particles; however, if it is to provide an objective 
description of a single particle, then it clearly violates special relativity (Howard 2007).  He 
wasn’t challenging the veracity of the predictions of quantum mechanics but rather its 
ontological interpretation. 
 As I mentioned in Section 2, I was mystified when I first read the EPR paper.  The 
conclusion of EPR was not that quantum mechanics is nonlocal nor that objective reality 
does not exist but rather that quantum mechanics “does not provide a complete description of 
the physical reality”.  In fact, Poldolsky penned the paper and Einstein was not happy with it. 
Howard (2007) points out that in a letter to Schrödinger written a month after the EPR paper 
was published, Einstein chose to base his argument for incompleteness on what he termed the 
“separation principle” and continued to present this argument “in virtually all subsequent 
published and unpublished discussions of the problem”. According to the separation 
principle, the real state of affairs in one part of space cannot be affected instantaneously or 
superluminally by events in a distant part of space. Suppose AB is the joint state of two 
systems, A and B, that interact and subsequently move away from each other to different 
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locations. (Schrödinger (1935) would later introduce the term entangled to describe such a 
joint state.)  In his letter to Schrödinger, Einstein explained (Howard 2007) 
After the collision, the real state of (AB) consists precisely of the real  
state A and the real state of B, which two states have nothing to do with  
one another. The real state of B thus cannot depend upon the kind of  
measurement I carry out on A [separation principle]. But then for the  
same state of B there are two (in general arbitrarily many) equally justified  
[wave functions] , which contradicts the hypothesis of a one-to-one or  
complete description of the real states. 
His conclusion was that quantum mechanics cannot provide a complete description of reality.  
Note that Einstein’s separation principle did not claim that a measurement of system A has no 
effect on the result of any measurement on system B but rather that a measurement of system 
A has no effect on the real state of system B. I’ll elaborate on this distinction shortly.  You 
can probably already guess the pragmatic resolution of the EPR paradox; however, it’s 
instructive to examine the details of the argument. 
 Perhaps the quintessential example of an EPR-type entangled state is the one 
introduced by Bohm and Aharanov (1957) and subsequently used by Bell in his 1964 paper.  
It consists of the emission of two oppositely moving spin ½ particles in a singlet state, i.e., 
the spins of the two particles are precisely opposite each other but in an indeterminate 
direction.  According to quantum mechanics, their combined wave function (quantum state) 
is given by 
     (1) 
where  and  indicate the up and down z components of the spins of particles 1 and 2.  Now 
suppose that the spin of particle 1 is measured with a Stern-Gerlach apparatus oriented in the 
 direction and is determined to be . Then we know the z component of the spin of particle 2 
will be .  That is, particle 2 can be characterized by the state . This perfect 
(anti)correlation is built into the two-particle system because they are in a singlet state. On 
the other hand, the original wave function can also be expressed in terms of the x components 
(or in any direction for that matter) of the spin, 
.   
Then, if the spin of particle 1 is measured with a Stern-Gerlach apparatus oriented in the  
direction and is determined to be , the spin of particle 2 will be , i.e., particle 2 is in the 
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state , a state fundamentally distinct from .  The immediate transition of 
particle 2 to either the state  or  is, of course, the process of state reduction 
discussed in Section 3.3 and is the basis for the claim of “action at a distance”.26  After Bell’s 
papers, some physicists and philosophers embraced the nonlocality inherent in quantum 
mechanics and the concomitant notion of instantaneous action at a distance.  Likewise, 
Einstein felt that quantum mechanics implied action at a distance and, therefore, violated his 
separation hypothesis.  Consequently, he concluded that quantum mechanics failed to 
provide “a one-to-one or complete description of the real states”; ergo, quantum mechanics is 
incomplete.  So Einstein and adherents of quantum nonlocality both ascribe to spooky action 
at a distance but while the latter embrace it, Einstein inferred from it that quantum mechanics 
does not provide a complete description of physical reality. 
Now consider a more pragmatic perspective.  For the entangled singlet state 
considered above, Einstein would conclude particle 2 has no unique (real) state.  Let me push 
back on this conclusion.  After their emission, the polarization of neither particle is known.  
Therefore, the two particles can be considered as two unpolarized particle beams.  For 
particle 2 this can be represented by a 50% mixture of spin up, , and spin down, , 
states (in any direction), a so-called mixed state.  A mixed state cannot be described by a pure 
quantum state (e.g., Schrödinger wave function or vector in Hilbert space) but is well 
described by its associated density matrix .  The density matrix for the unpolarized spin ½ 
particle 2 is given by  
      (2) 
 
with a similar expression for particle 1.  This density matrix is sufficient to completely 
describe any possible (spin) measurement of particle 2.  For example the expectation value 
(mean measurement) of any observable represented by an operator A is given by 
, i.e., the trace of the matrix  and, as always, the value of a single 
measurement is one of the eigenvalues of A.  For the above expression this implies that a 
measurement of the spin component in any direction will yield  for 50% of the 
measurements and  for 50% of the measurements subject to the usual statistical fluctuations.  																																																								26	As	discussed	above,	Dirac	(1958)	and	von	Neumann	(1955)	both	gave	detailed	treatments	of	state	reduction;	although,	it’s	not	clear	to	what	extent	they	ascribed	to	the	notion	of	action	at	a	distance.	
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This completely characterizes the spin measurements of either particle with no mention of 
what measurements are made on the other particle.  That is, the result of the measurement 
made on particle 2 is completely independent of any measurement carried out on particle 1.27  
I would call this the experimentalist’s or pragmatist’s separation hypothesis in contrast to 
Einstein’s version that the real state of particle 2 must be independent of any measurement 
carried out on particle 1.  I know of no observation or prediction of standard quantum 
mechanics that violates the pragmatist’s separation hypothesis.  As for Einstein’s separation 
hypothesis, a pragmatist would probably object to the notion of a real state or at least defer 
comment until an acceptable definition of “real state” is offered.28 
 On might object that Eq. 2 was pulled out of thin air and suggest that a proper 
quantum mechanical treatment might provide a more complete description of the individual 
particle states.  Not so.  Consider the density matrix of the pure entangled state in Eq. 1.  It is 
given by  and is in every way equivalent to the entangled state 
 itself.  So how do we conjure a single particle 2 state from the entangled state?   The 
standard method is to marginalize the two-particle density matrix over the possible states of 
particle 1.  This is accomplished by taking the partial trace of density matrix  over a 
basis of system 1, i.e.,  
       
    . 
 
This is precisely the density matrix of Eq. 2. That is, Eq. 2 describes the complete quantum 
state of particle 2 and characterizes any measurement made on that particle, of course subject 
to the statistical nature of all quantum mechanical predictions. 
 Okay, so far so good.  Nevertheless, you may object that these single particle mixed 
states are mute on the correlations of measurements made on the two states.  Fair enough, but 
now you are asking a different question.  That is, after making these independent 
measurements, what are the correlations between them?  To answer this question, to be sure, 
one needs the pure entangled state of Eq. 1 but this expression in no way implies that the 																																																								27	After	all,	the	measurement	made	on	particle	2	could	be	made	in	advance	of	even	selecting	the	type	of	measurement	to	be	made	on	particle	1.	28	I	posed	the	question	”What	are	Physical	States?”	in	a	recent	essay	(Boughn	2019b).		
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measurements made on particle 1 have any effect whatsoever on the measurements made on 
particle 2.  One might exhort, as did John Bell (1981), “The scientific attitude is that 
correlations cry out for explanation.”  Well, maybe but as we often have to remind our 
students, correlation does not necessarily imply causation and in any case one can certainly 
trace the source of the correlation back to the interaction between the two particles prior to 
their emission.   
There is a simple classical analog that emphasizes this point.  Suppose one randomly 
places either a white ball or a black ball in a box and then places the remaining ball in 
another box.  Now the two boxes are closed and sent off in opposite directions where they 
will encounter observers who open the boxes.  It’s clear each observer has a 50/50 chance of 
finding a white ball and a 50/50 chance of finding a black ball and that completely 
characterizes the state of the unopened box for each individual observer.  This can be 
confirmed by compiling the data from multiple (random) trials of the experiment. Yet it is 
also absolutely clear that the findings of the two observers will be completely correlated; if 
the observer of box 1 finds a white ball, the observer of box 2 will necessarily find a black 
ball and vice versa.  However, we would never claim that the act of observing a white ball in 
box 1 causes a black ball to appear in box 2.  Of course, quantum entanglement is a much 
richer phenomenon than classical entanglement and exhibits all the aspects of quantum 
interference with which we are familiar.  But this results from quantum superposition that 
lies at the heart of quantum mechanics, and has little to do with the notion of entanglement 
and certainly does not provide evidence of nonlocality and action at a distance. 
 Still, after we observe particle 1 and determine the z component of its spin to be , 
aren’t we justified in identifying the state of particle 2 to be ?  In which case, 
didn’t we cause its quantum state to collapse from its original mixed state in Eq. 2 to ?  
In a sense, the answer to this question is ‘yes’ but only in the sense of the pragmatic meaning 
of term “quantum state” as discussed in Section 3.3.  So after the measurement of particle 1, 
what is the quantum state of particle 2?  Is it still the density matrix  of Eq. 2 or is it the 
wave function ?  The premise of this question is wrong.  The quantum state is not an 
“it” in this sense.  The only “it” is the quantum system, the spin ½ particle.  The quantum 
state is not a physical object but rather a description of a physical object (Boughn 2019b), a 
transcription arising from Stapp’s “set of specifications”.  For the physicist who has just 
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observed particle 1 to be in the  state, the set of specifications leads to  while 
for the future observer of particle 2, the available set of specification leads to the density 
matrix  of Eq. 2. If the result of the observation of particle 1 is communicated 
(subluminally, of course) to the observer of particle 2, then the original specifications of the 
quantum system must be replaced by new ones that include the result of that measurement.  
“Then the original wave function [or density matrix in this case] will be naturally replaced by 
a new one, just as it would be in classical statistical theory”(Stapp 1972).  So for the 
pragmatist, the EPR paradox is no paradox at all but rather is simply another example of the 
wonders of standard quantum mechanics.   
Einstein contended that quantum mechanics implies “spooky action at a distance”; 
physicists and philosophers who accept quantum nonlocality are in agreement.  Their 
disagreement is a metaphysical one.  Einstein didn’t like this aspect of quantum mechanics 
whereas the latter group embraces it.  So where do they go wrong?  As I alluded to above, 
there is often a tendency to identify theoretical constructs of highly successful models with 
reality itself.  One can argue that this is as much the case with classical mechanics as with 
quantum mechanics.  The “particle” construct of the former is considered to be real in the 
same sense as the “wave function” construct of the latter.  Once one is lead down this path, it 
is inevitable to conclude that spooky action at a distance occurs in nature.  On the other hand, 
if one eschews the ontological interpretation of the wave function, then “action at a distance” 
is, at best, descriptive of how the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is applied. 
One must be extremely wary of extending such inferences to physical reality itself and, in 
fact, doing so is a violation of the 2nd corollary to my pragmatic philosophy.  I’ve always 
thought the proofs that standard quantum mechanics forbids sending superluminal signals 
should have disabused nonlocality advocates of their claims of action at a distance.  Once one 
attaches ontic significance to theoretical constructs, like the wave function, such 
metaphysical conclusions are inevitable.   
 
3.6  DOES GOD PLAY DICE? 
 A common thread running through the previous four quantum conundrums is the 
statistical nature of quantum mechanics.  Einstein was quite vocal on this count as he 
famously declared, “I…am convinced that He [God] is not playing at dice.” (Born 1971) 
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I confess that the statistical aspect of quantum mechanics also greatly bothered me in my 
younger days.  I usually expressed my dismay with something like  
The deterministic Schr dinger equation governs the evolution of  
the wave function (probability amplitude) but as far as I can discern,  
quantum theory proper is silent on the outcome of any particular  
measurement.  According to quantum mechanics, nothing ever happens! 
As I matured as an experimental physicist, I became acutely aware of the fact that everything 
I did was intimately connected to statistics and conclusions nearly always involved 
probabilistic statements.  This was so whether I was dealing with quantum mechanical or 
classical measurements.  So, as far as I’m concerned, classical physics is also a statistical 
affair (Boughn & Reginatto 2019). 
 Heisenberg felt that his indeterminacy relation was “the real basis for the occurrence 
of statistical relations in quantum mechanics” (see Section 3.2) and to a certain extent I agree 
with his conclusion.  But there is more to it than this.  First, what are the statistical relations 
in classical mechanics and from where do they arise?  Compare the uncertainty relation in 
quantum mechanics, Δ𝑝Δ𝑥 ≥ ℏ/2, with a corresponding relation in classical mechanics, 
Δ𝑝Δ𝑥 ≥ 0.  The minimum uncertainties in the two cases, ℏ/2 and 0, reflect differences in 
the quantum and the classical formalisms.  Such was Heisenberg’s reasoning.  What about 
the uncertainties in excess of ℏ/2 and 0?  For the quantum case the answer to this question is 
nuanced and I’ll return to it shortly.  In classical mechanics uncertainties are usually ascribed 
to “noise” and delegated to experimentalists for clarification.  However, this doesn’t have to 
be the case.  There are formulations of classical mechanics that allow one to include 
uncertainties in the formalism, just as in quantum mechanics. 
 A particularly powerful description of classical mechanics can be formulated using 
ensembles on configuration space (Hall & Reginatto 2005, 2016).  A Hamiltonian 
formulation for a classical particle of mass m under the influence of a potential  leads to the 
equations of motion, 
                                  0 and     (1) 
 
                                  0     (2) 
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where  is the probability density for the location of the particle and  is field 
canonically conjugate to .  The first equation is the probability continuity equation and the 
second is the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation.  The quantity  is interpreted as the 
local momentum density.  If the initial values of  and  are chosen so as to represent the 
uncertainty of the initial state of the particle, then the subsequent uncertainties are determined 
from the equations of motion.  In this formalism classical uncertainty, i.e., noise, can be 
included in the formalism just as it is in quantum mechanics.  The nonlinear Hamilton-Jacobi 
equations are certainly unwieldy and less useful than Newton’s laws.  However they are, in 
some sense, more general than Newton’s equations, which in any case are recovered by 
specifying  to be a Dirac delta function. 
 It is interesting that the H-J formalism is an alternative with which one can express 
standard quantum mechanics, as was pointed out by Madelung in the early days of quantum 
mechanics (Madelung 1927).  This is accomplished by adding a quantum term to the 
Hamilton-Jacobi equation, 
                         0   (3) 
and retaining the continuity equation (1).  Equations (1) and (3) are equivalent to the 
Schrödinger equation where the wave function  is related to  and  by  (Hall 
& Reginatto 2005, 2016).  The Hamilton-Jacobi formulation of classical and quantum 
mechanics also points to the importance of the quantum of action in the difference between 
the two.  If one sets , the quantum formulation reduces to the probabilistic formulation 
of classical mechanics. 
 To be sure, quantum mechanics is quite different from classical mechanics.  The 
addition of the quantum term in Equation (3) has enormous consequence.  In addition to the 
transition of Δ𝑝Δ𝑥 ≥ 0 to Δ𝑝Δ𝑥 ≥ ℏ/2, Equation (3) gives us wave/particle duality and all of 
the wonders associated with quantum interference.  The point is that these follow from 
Planck’s quantum of action and not from an inherent statistical nature of the theory. 
 In the above discussion I’ve implied there is an analogy between the quantum 
uncertainty in excess of  and classical uncertainties, i.e., noise.  In what sense is 
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this so?  Excess quantum uncertainty occurs for most systems in pure quantum states.29  How 
is this analogous to classical noise?  Recall Stapp’s (1972) prescription for transcribing a set 
of physical specifications into a wave function (pure quantum state), 
 … what experimentalists do, in practice, is to calibrate their devices… 
[then] with plausible assumptions…it is possible to build up a catalog of 
correspondences between what experimentalists do and see, and the wave  
functions of the prepared and measured systems. 
The resulting wave function then leads directly to the excess uncertainties in Heisenberg’s 
principle.  On the other hand, the same set of procedures leads classical physicists to arrive at 
noise estimates: careful calibration of devices; catalogs of the results of many measurements; 
subsequent estimates of uncertainties in these measurements; and the transcription of these 
uncertainties into the appropriate  and .  In the case of mixed quantum states, the analogy 
with classical uncertainty is more direct.  Consider the unpolarized beam of spin ½  
particles introduced in Section 3.5.  The quantum state is represented by the density matrix 
 where  is the probability for each of the two spin states and is, 
in every sense, equivalent to the classical probability of the spin components. 
 So the pragmatist’s answer to Einstein is that all of physics has probabilistic aspects.  
Whether this is dealt with in the theoretical formalism or characterized as noise is irrelevant.  
After all, the models we choose to represent the world and make sense of our experiences 
are, in the end, human inventions. 
 
3.7 GIBBS PARADOX AND THE SECOND LAW OF THERMODYNAMICS 
 So far, 5 out of the 6 conundrums I have discussed are quantum mechanical.  Let me 
end with a thoroughly classical paradox from 1875 that was posed by J. Willard Gibbs, one 
of the founders (along with Maxwell and Boltzmann) of statistical mechanics.  The Gibbs 
paradox involves the entropy of mixing and seemingly results in a violation of the second 
law of thermodynamics.  Suppose there are two volumes,  and , of ideal gases separated 
by a diaphragm, with  and  molecules respectively.  The two volumes of gases are 
presumed to be chemically distinct.  Also assume that the two volumes of gas have the same 
																																																								29	For	the	single	particle	case,	only	a	minimum	Gaussian	wave	packet	results	in	no	excess	noise,	i.e.,	,	and	even	in	that	case	the	system	immediately	evolves	so	as	 .	
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temperature T and pressure P.  From classical thermodynamics (and kinetic theory) we can 
express the entropies of the two volumes as  
 
where k is Boltzmann’s constant.  Now remove the diaphragm and allow the two gases to 
mix.  The entropy of this combined mixture is 
 
Therefore the change in the entropy, the entropy of mixing, is 
 . 
In the case that  and consequently , this becomes  
, the entropy of mixing.  The quantity  represents both the useful work 
that can be extracted from the system if the mixing is accomplished in a reversible manner as 
well as the minimum work required to separate the two mixed gases back to their original 
states.  I leave it as an exercise for the reader to demonstrate that both of these processes can 
be realized if one is in possession of two semipermeable membranes, one of which allows 
only gas molecules of volume  to pass through and the other only allows molecules of  to 
pass.30  It should be pointed out that “returning the gases to their original state” means only 
that all the molecules of type 1 are returned to  and all the molecules of type 2 are returned 
to , not that their original microstates, positions and momenta, are restored.  
  Now to the “paradox”.  Suppose the two volumes are filled with the same gas.  When 
the diaphragm is removed, the gases are again mixed and because there is no identification of 
types of gas in the above relations, the entropy of mixing is still given by .  
Now, simply replace the diaphragm and we immediately have the original state; all the 
macroscopic thermodynamic variables are the same as is the chemical composition of the 
two volumes.  Therefore, entropy of the systems seems to have decreased by , 
with no work nor any change in the entropy of the external world.  This is a clear violation of 
the 2nd law of thermodynamics.  It’s interesting that Gibbs never referred to this situation as a 
paradox.  We’ll return to this shortly. 
 The standard resolution of the paradox follows from the statistical mechanical 																																																								30	In	the	latter	process,	it	is	possible	to	unmix	the	gases	with	the	minimum	possible	work,	 .	
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expression for the entropy in terms of the number of microscopic states, , available to the 
macroscopic thermodynamic state, i.e., .  The argument is that interchanging 
any two molecules in the microscopic state of a system renders no change whatsoever in the 
macroscopic thermodynamics state.31  Because there are  ways of rearranging  particles 
of the same type, one must reduce  by this factor to take into account the over-counting of 
states.  Therefore, the expression for entropy must be reduced by . By  Stirling’s 
approximation, this is  so  
 
Likewise, the total entropy after mixing must be reduced by . Again 
using Stirling’s approximation we have 
 
Using the ideal gas law, , we conclude that , as desired. 
The entropy of mixing has vanished.  In the case that  and  represent different chemical 
species, there are only  ways of rearranging particles of the same type so that the 
entropy of the mixed gas must be reduced by .  I leave it as an exercise for 
the reader to show that in this case the entropy of mixing is the same as previously computed, 
that is, for equal volumes of gas . 
 There are two bothersome aspects of the above argument.  Just how alike must the 
two types of gas molecules be in order to justify replacing  with  in the 
Boltzmann relation  and why must we divide by these configurations 
in the first place, i.e., why aren’t these configurations to be counted in the available 
microscopic states?  The standard textbook response to these questions invokes the quantum 
nature of matter.  For particles of the same type, there is no absolutely no distinction between 
a particular multi-particle quantum state and the quantum state with any two of the particles 
interchanged.  A statement like the following usually accompanies this argument: 
  The Gibbs paradox thus foreshadowed already in the  
last century conceptual difficulties that were resolved 
satisfactorily only by the advent of quantum mechanics. (Reif 1965) 																																																								31	This	is	analogous	to	the	point	made	in	arguing	that	replacing	the	diaphragm	for	a	single	component	ideal	gas	restores	the	system	to	its	original	thermodynamic	state.	
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While this explanation may seem like a fait accompli, there’s something a bit strange about 
it.  How is it that a conundrum in the formalism of one physical model, classical 
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, is resolved by the formalism of another physical 
model, quantum mechanics?  One may get the mistaken impression that the Gibb's paradox is 
somehow intimately related to quantum phenomena.  It’s hard for me to believe that the 
concept of entropy in classical physics could possibly presage quantum mechanics. 
 So it seems that entropy has two different descriptions.  Which is right?  Does it 
follow the Clausius prescription, , or the Boltzmann prescription, ?  
The premise of this question is wrong in the same sense as in section 3.5.  Entropy is not an 
“it” in this sense.  The only “it” is the thermodynamic system.  As noted in Section 3.5 with 
regard to the quantum state, entropy is not a physical property of a thermodynamic system 
but rather a description of that system.  The only sensible resolution must come from 
considering how physicists use this concept, the 2nd corollary to my pragmatic philosophy of 
physics (see Section 2). 
 The most direct and classical extrication from Gibbs’ paradox comes from the 
realization that entropy is not an ontic property of matter but rather is a concept that derives 
its meaning from the manner in which physicists use it.  In classical thermodynamics, the 
meaning of the entropy of mixing is derived, in part, from the thesis that the quantity  
represents the useful work that can be extracted from the system if the mixing is 
accomplished in a reversible (isothermal) manner and as the minimum amount of work 
required to separate the two mixed gases back to their original states.  If two different gases 
are so similar that there is no known process by which useful work can be extracted from the 
process of mixing as well as no known thermodynamics process by which the gases can be 
subsequently separated, then for all practical circumstances the two gases can be considered 
indistinguishable.  Then in the Clausius prescription one can simply declare there is no 
entropy of mixing, , and in the Boltzmann prescription that the number of 
microstates is given by .  There is no necessity to appeal to quantum 
mechanics and the identicality of quantum particles.  Gibb's fully understood this point as 
early as 1874; however, his explanation seems to have been largely forgotten by subsequent 
textbook authors ( Jaynes 1992).  As Jaynes puts it 
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paradoxical only to one who supposes, erroneously, that entropy is a  
property of the microstate… thermodynamics has a greater flexibility  
in useful applications than is generally recognized. The experimenter  
is at liberty to choose his macrovariables as he wishes; whenever he  
chooses a set within which there are experimentally reproducible  
connections like an equation of state, the entropy appropriate to the  
chosen set will satisfy a second law that correctly accounts for the 
macroscopic observations that the experimenter can make by  
manipulating the macrovariables within his set. 
 The above discussion is by no means intended to put an end to the investigation of 
entropy, which is one of the most fascinating and useful concepts in both classical and 
quantum physics.  Many eminent physicists, including Gibbs, Boltzmann, Planck, Einstein, 
Schrödinger, Pauli, and others have made important contributions elucidating the concept of 
entropy, and this tradition continues today (e.g. Lieb and Yngvason 2000).  These efforts are 
part of the process of creating useful stories that help us make sense of the physical world.  
There needn’t be a single story about entropy.  In fact, this is a common theme in 
thermodynamics.  It is the flexibility of thermodynamics that is the source of its strength in 
dealing with a wide variety of physical phenomena. 
 
4.  FINAL REMARKS 
 Now that I have outlined my pragmatic philosophy of the foundations of physics, it is 
incumbent upon me to evaluate its utility, that is, if I am to be true to its pragmatic label.  The 
examples recounted in Sections 1 and 3 were intended to do just that.  In short, they were 
proffered to demonstrate how various paradoxes and conundrums in physics have been 
perpetuated primarily by attributing ontic existence to theoretical constructs as if they were 
components of a physical reality.  My pragmatic philosophy is intended to point this out and 
then dismiss them as faux problems that, in principle, will never be resolved.  Of course, the 
two classical paradoxes, the twin paradox and the Gibbs paradox, have been dismissed long 
ago; however, even about these, misleading pronouncements continue to be made.  On the 
other hand, the quantum conundrums, especially the quantum/classical divide, wave function 
collapse, and the spooky action at a distance of entangled states, have remained unresolved 
after nearly a century.   This ought to be an indication that there is something seriously wrong 
with the theoretical interpretations from which they emerge as I have endeavored to 
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demonstrate. 
 On the other hand, it can be argued that attempts to resolve apparent paradoxes have 
led to important advances in physics or at least to important advances in understanding 
physical models.  As I have already pointed out, the Gibbs paradox has stimulated important 
work on entropy that has continued to this day. Even the continuing discussions of the twin 
paradox have contributed to the pedagogy of special relativity.  Regarding the quantum 
arena, many have attributed John Bell’s 1964 paper with initiating both experimental and 
theoretical advances in quantum entanglement and thereby to progress in the new fields of 
quantum information and quantum computing, although I’m less sanguine about this claim.  
In 1957, Hugh Everett introduced the “many worlds” interpretation of quantum mechanics32 
precisely in order to solve two of the primary aspects of the measurement problem, the 
classical/quantum divide and the collapse of the wave function.  While he was motivated by, 
what I consider to be, non-existent problems33, many people credit Everett with inspiring 
them to pursue research in new areas of physics, including decoherence theory, quantum 
information, and the application of quantum mechanics to cosmology (Bryne 2010).  While I 
doubt many would declare that the measurement problem in quantum mechanics has been 
successfully resolved34, I can’t argue with these physicists or even pretend to know what 
motivates their endeavors, theoretical or experimental.  A discussion of the source of 
scientific creativity is certainly beyond my poor powers and I won’t attempt to address this 
topic here. 
 There are several topics I have avoided even though they have had an exaggerated 
impact on fundamental physics in the last few decades.  I use the term “exaggerated” because 
of the dearth of experimental/observational evidence associated with them and until there is 
more evidence, there is little a pragmatist can say about them.  These include dark matter and 
dark energy, inflation, and string theory.   
The notion of dark matter has been with us for nearly a century.  It is (presumably) a 																																																								32	To	be	sure,	it	was	Bryce	DeWitt	and	Neil	Graham	(1973)	who	coined	the	term	“many	worlds”.		Everett	didn’t	subscribe	to	this	description	of	his	“universal	wave	function”.	33	While	I	am	not	particularly	enamored	with	Everett’s	theory	of	the	universal	wave	function,	I’ve	concluded	(Boughn	2018b)	that,	contrary	to	their	own	assessments,	Everett’s	and	Bohr’s	interpretations	have	a	great	deal	in	common.	34	Recall,	however,	that	I	don’t	consider	the	problems	of	measurement	in	quantum	mechanics	even	need	to	be	resolved	(Boughn	&	Reginatto	2013).	
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new kind of matter that is known only through its gravitational attraction to ordinary matter 
and to itself but is otherwise invisible.  The mounting evidence for its existence has increased 
dramatically over the last 40 years, but as of yet there has been no direct detection.  Even so, 
a great deal of progress has been made in ruling out various classes of models of dark matter.  
Is the claim of the existence of dark matter true, i.e., useful?  I would say the answer is ‘yes’ 
in the sense that once introduced, it has proved to be a useful concept in the description of the 
gravitational clustering on many different scales.  For example, there is evidence for unseen 
sources of gravity on the scales of individual galaxies, clusters of galaxies, and even on the 
large-scale structure of the universe.   
Dark energy is a generalization of the cosmological constant introduced by Einstein a 
century ago.  Like dark matter, it is an “energy” only known through its gravitational effect 
but, in this case, its only consequence is the acceleration of the expansion of the universe.  
There have, indeed, been proffered many theoretical models of dark matter and dark energy.  
Some of these models seem to fit, at least qualitatively, into other fundamental physical 
theories.  However, until a specific model of dark matter or dark energy has been verified by 
observations other than its gravitational attraction or the strength of that attraction has been 
shown to follow directly from some other physical theory, there is little a pragmatist like me 
has to offer.35 
 Inflation is a model that predicts the exponential expansion of the early universe.  It 
explains both why the current 3-dimensional geometry of the universe is approximately 
Euclidean and, in addition, why the universe is so uniform on large scales.  Like models of 
dark matter and dark energy, there are qualitative reasons why we might expect inflation to 
follow from other physical theories.  So far there are no observations, other than the large-
scale structure of the universe, that confirm or refute inflation.  Worse yet, there are so many 
models of inflation that it seems certain any set of observations are likely to agree with one 
or more of those models.  After one of the models has been identified, then it might be 
possible to help confirm it with new observations.  Until then, like dark matter and dark 
energy, there is little a pragmatist like me has to offer. 
 My knowledge of string theory is nearly nonexistent so my comments regarding it are 																																																								35	I	have	personally	embarked	on	several	unsuccessful	attempts	to	directly	detect	dark	matter	and	(with	Rob	Crittenden)	succeeded	in	finding	additional	evidence	for	the	gravitational	effect	of	dark	energy	in	the	context	of	the	integrated	Sachs-Wolfe	effect	(Boughn	&	Crittenden	2004).	
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offered only from afar.  During a talk at NYU, I once heard Gordon Kane pronounce that the 
mathematics of string theory is so powerful and so general that it can describe nearly any 
phenomenon and then proceeded to say that quantum gravity seemed so natural within its 
context that string theory was surely the true description of quantum gravity.36  Hmmm….  
There also seems to be a dearth of specific calculations relevant to empirical results so that 
it’s difficult for a pragmatist to evaluate the truth, i.e., the utility, of string theory. In fact, I’ve 
often heard theorists proclaim that we still don’t know how to construct a complete theory.  
Still others claim that there are 10500 or more versions of string theory.  On the other hand, 
there are a great many theorists who extol the virtues of the theory.  How so?  Certainly the 
mathematical beauty of the theory motivates some as well as the possibility of unifying all 
the fundamental theories of physics into a single “theory of everything”.  Richard Dawid’s 
recent book (2013), String Theory and the Scientific Method, argues for a new definition of 
scientific progress on the basis of purely theoretical notions.  His premise relies heavily on an 
ontological view of physical theories so, again, a pragmatist like me has little to offer on this 
account. 
 Mathematics certainly figures heavily in any discussion of string theory as well as to 
the general view of physical theories as espoused by Dirac and Tegmark (see Section 2).  
You probably will have noticed that I haven’t mentioned where mathematics fits into my 
pragmatic philosophy.  My knowledge of the fundamentals of mathematics is as meager as of 
string theory so I can say very little about it.  However, I would hope that one might be able 
to take a pragmatic view of mathematics, in which case truth would be judged by utility.  I 
can imagine that the usefulness of a certain area of mathematics can be judged by the degree 
with which it can be applied to other areas of mathematics or perhaps to the extent that it can 
help unify the content within a given area.  Still, as a pragmatist, I would hope that its utility 
can also be judged by how useful it is in other areas of human activity, physics and beyond.  
Certainly mathematics, up till now, has proven to be extraordinarily useful to human 
endeavors.  Otherwise, mathematics might be relegated to the status of a game (albeit an 
incredibly complex game) like go or chess. 
 Finally, I can’t resist pointing out the irony presented by my pragmatic philosophy of 																																																								36	Among	my	philosophically	motivated	endeavors,	I’ve	written	a	couple	of	papers	suggesting	that	perhaps	there	is	no	need	for	a	quantum	theory	of	gravity	(Rothman	&	Boughn,	2006;	Boughn	2009).	
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physics to a self-avowed atheist like myself.  If, indeed, physical theories are merely stories, 
all be they extremely intricate stories, about our experiences, then they would seem to be on 
the same footing as the stories of religion.  Although I have no problem with scientists (e.g., 
Richard Dawkins and Lawrence Krauss) who criticize religion, especially organized religion, 
I’ve long ago come to the conclusion that trying to prove whether or not god exists is a 
useless endeavor.37  My only recourse is to ask to what extent religious stories are true, i.e., 
useful.  For me, the answer is not at all.38  
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